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Reporter's Draft for the Working Group
on Principles to Use When Considering
the Federalization of Criminal Law
by
SARA SuN BEALE*

IntroductiOn
By virtually every measure, the federal government is playing an
increasingly important role in the enforcement of criminal law. Participants at the Three-Branch Roundtable on "Overlapping and Separate Spheres ...State and Federal Jurisdiction" generally agreed that

the time is ripe for a reexamination of the principles used to federalize
criminal law. They identified two main concerns justifying such a reexamination: (1) the increasing criminal caseload is placing a strain
on the federal courts, the Bureau of Prisons, and other components of
the federal criminal justice system; and (2) the increasing federalization of crime has the potential to cause an unplanned but nonetheless
fundamental change in the relationship between the federal government and the states and in the character of the federal courts. In the
first Section of our Report, we describe the changes that have occurred in the federal criminal caseload, the impact of the increased
caseload on various elements of the federal criminal justice system,
and some of the factors responsible for these changes. In the second
Section of our Report, we summarize the discussion that occurred at
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Working Group Reporter.
Other Members of the Working Group: Lynn Abraham, District Attorney, Philadelphia
County; Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey; Senator Joseph Biden, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary;
Representative Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, House Judiciary Committee (retired); Jo-Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice; Tom Hillier, Federal Public Defender; Hubert Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota; Stephen Saland, New York
Senate; Howard Shapiro, General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Chief Justice
Jean Trnage, Supreme Court of Montana; Presiding Judge Frederick Weisberg, Criminal
Division, D.C. Superior Court; Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, S.D.N.Y.; Judge

Ann Williams, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
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the Roundtable and comments received from participants in the wake
of the Conference.
I. A H-istorical and Statistical Overview of the Change in the
Federal Criminal Caseload
A. The Historical Development of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction

Until the Civil War, only a small number of federal offenses existed, and there was little if any overlap between the offenses subject
to state and federal prosecution. Federal crimes were limited to those
necessary to prevent injury to or interference with the federal government itself or its programs. Since the federal government was small
and it conducted few programs, the list of offenses required to protect
federal interests was correspondingly restricted.' Except in those areas where federal jurisdiction was exclusive (the District of Columbia
and the federal territories), federal law did not reach crimes against
individuals, which were the exclusive concern of the states.
Not all federal crimes were prosecuted in the federal courts during this period. Many early federal criminal statutes provided for concurrent state court jurisdiction. 2 Although legislation authorizing
state court jurisdiction over federal crimes was originally supported as
a means of curbing federal judicial power, it came to be viewed as an
infringement on state sovereignty. 3 In 1874 Congress reacted by enacting legislation declaring that the federal courts had exclusive juris4
diction over federal offenses.
After the Civil War, Congress expanded the scope of federal
criminal jurisdiction, extending it for the first time to subjects clearly
within the police powers of the states. The unprecedented postwar
growth in interstate transportation and commerce created new national problems that demanded national solutions. The first legisla1. The principal antebellum federal crimes were (1) acts threatening the existence of
the federal government (e.g., treason); (2) misconduct of federal officers (eg., bribery); (3)
interference with the operation of the federal courts (e.g., perjury); and (4) interference
with other governmental programs (e.g., theft of government property and revenue fraud).
See generally Sara S. Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction,in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JusTIcE 775-79 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Carriage Tax Act of 1794, ch. 45, § 10, 1 Stat. 373 (authorizing prosecution in state court of any case arising more than 50 miles from the nearest federal court).
3. The Virginia Supreme Court held such legislation unconstitutional on the grounds
that one sovereign cannot enforce the criminal laws of another nation. Jackson v. Row, 2
Va. Cas. 34 (1815). Other state courts followed suit. Charles Warren, Federal Criminal
Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REv. 545, 578-80 (1925).

4. Rev. Stat. § 711 (1874) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3231).
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tion aimed at the victimization of private citizens involved use of the
mails to effectuate fraudulent schemes or to distribute lottery circulars
and obscene publications. The next step was the adoption of penalties
for misconduct involving the use of interstate facilities, such as railroads, which were subject to federal regulation under the Commerce
Clause. The earliest provisions were quite narrow, but during the
1880s Congress enacted two much broader provisions, the Sherman
Antitrust Act and the law creating the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The ICC Act was especially significant because it set the
pattern for later legislation, establishing a federal administrative
agency, a regulatory framework, and a comprehensive range of criminal as well as civil penalties. 5
The constitutionality of the new laws was challenged on the
grounds that they allowed federal prosecution of conduct-such as
fraud-that was traditionally subject only to state regulation. The
Supreme Court generally upheld the new legislation, 6 holding that
Congress could employ its power over interstate commerce to assist
7
the states in matters such as the suppression of lotteries.
The next major expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction resulted
from the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited
the sale or distribution of liquor and explicitly granted "concurrent"
enforcement authority to the states and the federal government. Prohibition resulted in a phenomenal increase in the number of federal
prosecutions in the 1920s and 1930s. In the peak year, 1932, there
were 65,960 Prohibition-related criminal cases in the federal courts. 8
Although the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed in 1933, federal jurisdiction never receded entirely to its narrow pre-Prohibition
scope. The country was in the grip of a national depression, and an
5. More recently, Congress followed the same pattern in legislation dealing with national labor relations, occupational health and safety, water pollution, and coal mine safety;
in each case the legislation rested on the commerce power.
6. One major exception was the Supreme Court's treatment of the civil rights legisla-

tion, which rendered it largely ineffective until more liberal decisions in the middle of the
next century. See generally 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE Umrrnn
STATES: CIVIL RIGHrS 10, 99-172, 443-791 (1970).

7.

Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). The Court emphasized that the federal

laws in question "supplemented the action" of the states, which might otherwise be "overthrown or disregarded by the agency of interstate commerce." IL at 356-57. An earlier
case, In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892), upheld federal prohibitions against the misuse of
the mails on a similar but narrower ground, concluding that federal authority could be
employed to prohibit misuse of facilities provided by the federal government.
8. Edward Rubin, A Statistical Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBs. 494, 497 tbl. 1 (1934).
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influential congressional committee reported that the prevalence and
severity of the crimes being committed and the inability of the existing
agencies to cope with them required federal action in "a field which
had, until then, been regarded as primarily a matter of local or State
concern." 9 As a result of this committee's work, a large number of
new federal laws were adopted in the 1930s, many of which dealt for
the first time with crimes of violence against private individuals and
businesses. These included the statutes dealing with bank robbery, extortion and robbery affecting interstate commerce, interstate transmission of extortionate communications, interstate flight to avoid
prosecution, and interstate transportation of stolen property.1 0 During the same period, Congress also enacted the Lindbergh kidnapping
law, the securities laws, and the first federal firearms legislation.
None of these enactments broke any new theoretical ground, since the
authority to enact criminal legislation under the Commerce Clause
was now well established. They did, however, reflect a growing willingness on the part of the Congress that had enacted the New Deal
social and economic legislation to assert jurisdiction over an increasingly broad range of conduct clearly within the traditional police powers of the states.
In the 1960s and 1970s Congress employed the commerce power
to attack organized crime with a series of new criminal statutes. The
first of these was the Travel Act," which authorized federal criminal
penalties for interstate travel intended to facilitate gambling, narcotic
traffic, prostitution, extortion, and bribery-illegal activities frequently associated with organized crime. 12 A few years later, Congress authorized criminal penalties for extortionate credit transactions
("loan sharking"), which provided a source of funds for organized
crime. 13 Finally, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 14 which provided heavy penalties (including forfeiture) upon proof of a pattern of racketeering activity
with the requisite effect on an interstate enterprise. RICO also cre9. S.REP. No. 1189, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 38 (1937).
10. See id. at 40-54.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
12. The Travel Act was the first compound offense, i.e., an offense that defined the
violation of existing federal and state offenses as elements of a new federal offense. Later
offenses using this technique include RICO and continuing criminal enterprise (CCE).
13. Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 2 Stat. 159 (18 U.S.C. § 891 et
seq.).
14. Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922, 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68).
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ated a civil treble damage action for private plaintiffs injured by
racketeering.
Though RICO ultimately generated more cases, the loan sharking provisions broke new theoretical ground as Congress criminalized
a whole class of activity (loan sharking) based upon a finding that the
class of activity affected interstate commerce. No proof was required
that the conduct involved in an individual prosecution had an effect
on commerce. Upholding the loan sharking statute in 1971, the
Supreme Court stated that the courts' only function in reviewing such
class-based legislation is to determine whether the prohibited class of
activity is within the reach of federal power; if so, courts have no
power to excise trivial individual instances of the class.15
A comprehensive federal drug control statute was enacted in
1970 on the basis of a similar finding that the class of activity proscribed has an impact on interstate commerce. 16 Numerous other
pieces of anti-drug legislation have been enacted since that time, including provisions adding new crimes and others increasing the penalties for existing offenses. Congress also enacted a series of criminal
statutes dealing with currency reporting and money laundering to pro7
vide support for the drug and tax laws.'
A concomitant development also occurred: beginning in the
1960s Congress appropriated federal funds to support state and local
law enforcement. Pilot programs were first established under legislation passed in 1965, and in 1968 Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, which established the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA).1 8 This legislation authorized the
LEAA to make grants to state and local agencies to strengthen and
improve law enforcement, and provided for more than $100 million
15. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 1246 (1971).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3)-(6).
17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 (willful failure to file currency transaction report), 5324 (structuring transactions to avoid currency reporting requirements); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57
(money laundering).
18. The legislative history cites with approval the following statement by the President calling for enactment of legislation on this subject:
Substantially greater resources must be devoted to improving the entire criminal
justice system. The Federal Government must not and will not try to dominate
the system. It could not do so if it tried. Our system of enforcement is essentially
local; based upon local initiatives, generated by local energies, and controlled by
local officials. But the Federal Government must help to strengthen the system,
and to encourage the kind of innovation needed to respond to the problem of

crime in America.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2115.
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per year in funding. 19 The act also authorized the provision of in-kind
aid, particularly FBI training of state and local law enforcement
20
personnel.
The 1980s and 1990s brought increased public concern with violent crime, and Congress responded with the enactment of a number
of new federal offenses, such as carjacking 2l and new firearms offenses,22 as well as legislation specifically aimed at violent career
criminals. 23 During this period Congress also created new federal
crimes to deal with a variety of other social ills, such as the failure to
pay child support, 24 fraud in connection with identification documents, 25 computer fraud, 26 and the disruption of animal enterprises,
such as laboratories and circuses.2 7
In general, Congress simply added each new provision to those
already on the books. Efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to enact compre-

hensive criminal code reform failed. As a result, there are now
roughly 3,000 federal crimes. By the mid-1990s the accumulation of
new statutes had reversed the pattern that held for the first century of
the nation: the bulk of the federal criminal code now treats conduct
that is also subject to regulation under the states' general police powers. 29 It should be noted, however, that one comprehensive piece of
reform legislation was passed: the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,30
which created the Sentencing Commission and authorized it to promulgate sentencing guidelines; the resulting guidelines have revolutionized federal sentencing.
19. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 101, 520, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
20. Id. § 403.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2119.
22. See, e.g, Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)).
23. Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(4) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)),
24. Child Support and Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. §§ 228, 3563, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3793, 3769cc-3797.
25. False Identification Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1738, 39 U.S.C.
§ 3001.
26. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
27. Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 43.
28. Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 81 (1992).
29. For one commentary on this shift, see William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty,
Federalism, and National Criminal Laws: Modernist Constitutional Doctrine and the
Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 AM. CRIM. L. Rnv. 1740 (1989).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq.; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998.
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B.

The Impact of the Expansion of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction

(1)

Increases in the Criminal Caseload

One of the major themes at the Roundtable was the change in the
federal courts' caseload as a result of the expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction and the commitment of greater federal resources to criminal prosecutions. In particular, attention was drawn to the very large
increases in the criminal caseload that have occurred since 1980. Between 1980 and 1992, the number of criminal cases filed in the federal
courts increased by 70 percent, from 27,968 to 47,472, and the number
of defendants prosecuted rose 78 percent, from 38,033 to 67,632.31
The increase in federal drug and firearm offenses was even sharper.
The number of drug cases fied in the federal courts roughly quadrupled, from 3,130 cases (6,678 defendants) to 12,833 cases (25,033 defendants).3 2 Firearms prosecutions also quadrupled, from 931
prosecutions in 1980 to 3,917 in 1992 3 Annual criminal case filings
per sitting judge increased from 58 to 84 during the same period3 4
Criminal filings in the appellate courts have doubled since 1980. 3While the increases since 1980 have been significant, the current
criminal caseload is not unprecedented.3 6 As revealed in figure 1 below, 37 the criminal caseload has fluctuated widely since 1960, and the
number of federal criminal prosecutions was approximately the same
in 1972 as it is today. Indeed, because the number of federal judges
has increased substantially since 1972, the rate of criminal filings per
judge was significantly higher during that period than it is today.
Moreover, federal criminal filings now account for a smaller percentage of the federal courts' caseload than they did in 1972. Today criminal cases account for only seventeen percent of all filings in the district
courts, as compared with roughly one third of all filings in 1972.
31.

ADmiNisrRATrWE OFFICE OF TiE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE Di-

RECTOR 1980 AND 1992 tbl. D-2.
32. Id.
33. Id.

34.

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF

CIVIL AND CRnMNAL JUSTICE 3 (Long Range Planning Series, Paper No. 2) (1994).
35. Id.

36. The number of federal criminal cases reached its all-time high in 1932,as a flood
of Prohibition cases swelled the total number of cases to 92,174, more than 2 1/2 times the
total number of cases in 1918, the last year before Prohibition. Rubin, supra note 8.
37. Figure 1 is reprinted from the FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATON OF CIvIL AND CRimINAL JusnC 51 (1994).
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Figure 1
Federal Criminal Cases Commenced, Excluding Transfers,
1960-1992
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Source: Statistics Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
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(2) Changes in the Nature of the Criminal Caseload and in the Resources
Required

While the absolute number of criminal cases in the federal courts
today is not unprecedented, criminal cases are consuming an unprecedented share of federal judicial resources. Though criminal cases
presently account for only seventeen percent of the federal judicial
docket, they take forty-eight percent of federal judges' time.3 8 In
many districts, the situation is considerably more extreme. In the
Southern District of Florida, district judges spend eighty-four percent
of their trial time on criminal cases, leaving only sixteen percent for a
wide range of civil cases.3 9 By 1992, thirty-eight of the ninety-two federal districts devoted more than fifty percent of their trial dockets to
criminal cases. 40 Some district judges have been unable to try a civil
41
case for a year or more.
Several factors appear to account for the increased share of federal judicial resources being consumed by criminal cases. First, the
cases themselves are different than in any time in the past, and they
require more judicial resources. The federal caseload in 1972 included
a substantial number of relatively straightforward offenses that could
typically be disposed of quickly. Selective service offenses, auto theft,
forgery, and counterfeiting accounted for twenty-three percent of federal defendants charged in 1972, and only four percent in 1992.42
Only eighteen percent of defendants were charged with drug offenses
in 1972, as compared with forty-one percent in 1992.43 Not only have
drug filings increased, but the nature of the charges in drug cases has
also changed, with the percentage of drug distribution cases increasing, and the percentage of the simpler possession cases decreasing
sharply.44 The effect of this change is substantial. A Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) time study found that cocaine and heroin distribution
cases take four times as much judicial time per defendant as cases
involving possession of the same drugs.45
38. Professor Sullivan's statement, at 18.
39. Judge Marcus's statement, at 28.
40. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.

COURTS, THE CRmUNAL CASELOAD: THE
NATURE OF CHANGE 1 (1994) [hereinafter THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD].

41. Miner, supra note 28, at 686 (quoting a judge from the Eastern District of New
York).
42. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 40, at 5-6 figs. 4, 6.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 8 (distribution cases take an average of 6 hours compared with 1.5 hours for
possession cases). Marijuana cases show a similar pattern. Id.
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While the overall percentage of multiple defendant cases has remained fairly stable since the early 1970s, the number of multi-defendant cases has grown by seventy percent since 1980, and the number of
multi-defendant drug cases has grown by thirty percent in just the last
four years. 46 The number of jury trials with more than one defendant
increased by thirty-five percent in the last four years. 47 Multiple defendant cases are more complex, and they consume far more judicial
resources than cases involving a single defendant. A recent FJC time
study found that the average judge time per defendant was 5.8 hours
in multi-defendant cases, but only 3.0 hours in single defendant
48
cases.
The number of federal criminal trials is at an all-time high, ten
percent higher than the previous high reported in 1970.49 Perhaps
even more important, federal criminal trials are increasingly lengthy.
In 1970 the average length of a criminal jury trial in federal court was
2.5 days; it is now 4.4 days. 50 Very long trials have now become commonplace: criminal trials in the 6 to 20-day range have increased 118
percent since 1973.51
One district judge's comments provide a vivid description of what
these statistics can mean. He had a drug case pending with fifteen
defendants; it was his third case in less than a year with more than a
dozen defendants. Each case required the appointment of separate
counsel for almost all defendants, and counsel for each defendant then
had to separately review government documents and tape recordings,
a time-consuming process. Getting these cases to the plea or trial
stage, the judge summed up, "requires many motions and status conferences, and they generate unbelievable amounts of paper." The experience of this judge was not unique; indeed he noted that each judge
in his district had had at least one multiple defendant case of unusual
length within the last year.
Another change in the federal system is the increased judicial
time being devoted to sentencing. The Sentencing Guidelines, which
went into effect in 1987, require extensive factual findings and legal
conclusions in each case. Guidelines sentencing has increased significantly the time district judges spend on sentencing. Ninety percent of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 1.
Id.
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federal judges surveyed by the Federal Courts Study Committee
stated that sentencing had become more time consuming, with over
half reporting an increase of at least twenty-five percent and a third
reporting an increase of over fifty percent in the time required for
sentencing. 52 This estimate was confirmed by a Federal Judicial
Center time study, which found that the average time for sentencing
in Guidelines cases was twenty-five percent more than for non-Guidelines cases. 53 Sentencing appeals have also resulted in an increased
burden on the courts of appeals. The Sentencing Reform Act permits
either the defendant or the government to appeal a sentence, and
even a defendant who pled guilty may nonetheless file an appeal to
contest his sentence. Each year from 1990 to 1993, appeals raising
sentencing issues alone accounted for at least twenty-six percent of
criminal appeals in cases subject to the Guidelines. 54 Prior to the reform of the sentencing process, few if any of these appeals could have
been brought. The appeal of sentencing issues has also made appeals
from convictions more complex and difficult to resolve, and most appeals from convictions now also raise one or more sentencing issues.
In 1993, for example, only thirty percent of criminal appeals did not
involve a sentencing issue, and that percentage falls to fifteen percent
if the calculations are based exclusively on cases to which the Guidelines are applicable. 55 These changes flowing from the reform of the
sentencing process have a substantial effect on the workload of the
courts of appeals since criminal appeals now account for approxi56
mately one-fourth of the appellate caseload.
TWo other factors, which have not generally been noted, have
also resulted in an increased allocation of judicial time to sentencing
issues in criminal cases. First, the overall conviction rate has increased
substantially since the 1970s. Two decades ago the conviction rate was
approximately seventy-five percent; it has risen gradually and is now
52.

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE 137 (Apr. 1990).

53. Letter from John Shapard, Research Division, Federal Judicial Center, to Sara
Sun Beale, Duke University School of Law (Mar. 29, 1995) (on file with author) (average
judge time 76 minutes in Guidelines cases, 61 minutes in non-Guidelines cases).
54. These calculations were based exclusively on classified cases to which the Guidelines were applicable, excluding a small number of cases (612 in 1993) in which the type of
appeal was not classified. Although the Guidelines became effective November 1, 1987,
there are still some non-Guidelines appeals (1,870 in 1993).
55. These calculations are based exclusively on classified cases, excluding the few

cases (612 in 1993) that were not classified.
56. In the twelve months ending March 31, 1993, criminal appeals accounted for 24%
of the filings in the courts of appeals. A
snxSRATivE OFmIcE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL Jut rOAL WORmOAD STATISrICS 10 tbl. B-1 (1993).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

holding steady at roughly eighty-five percent.5 7 Though the number
of prosecutions was nearly the same in 1972 as in 1992, there were
37,220 convictions in 1972 and 50,260 in 1992.58 This larger number of

defendants must, as noted above, be sentenced in accordance with
more time-consuming procedures.
The Sentencing Reform Act also gave the federal courts new responsibility for supervision of defendants following conviction. The
Sentencing Reform Act requires that most defendants be sentenced to
a term of supervised release and provides that the federal courts,
rather than the parole board, monitor supervised release. The impact
of monitoring supervised release is just beginning to be felt, as defendants sentenced under the Guidelines are beginning to complete their
sentences in large numbers. In just two years, from 1990 to 1992, the
number of persons serving supervised release roughly quadrupled,
growing from 5,011 to 19,362. 59 While the impact of this new responsibility has been modest to date, it is likely to add significantly to the
federal courts' workload as the number of persons on supervised release grows.
(3) CorrespondingDecline in the Civil Trial Docket

The increased criminal caseload has an inevitable impact on the
remainder of the federal courts' docket. Criminal cases receive top
priority because of the mandates of the Speedy Trial Act, which requires dismissal of charges that are not brought within the time periods specified by the Act.60 While the speedy trial clock is tolled
during certain pretrial proceedings, 61 the total time allotted-70
days6 2-is so short that the Act places significant pressure on prosecutors and court personnel. It seems relatively clear that the federal
courts have responded to the increased pressure from the criminal
caseload by reducing the resources available for civil cases, and particularly for the trial of civil cases.
The total number of trials in the federal system held relatively
constant from 1980-1992, at approximately 20,000,63 but criminal trials
57. Tm CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 40, at 10.
58. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 1972 AND 1992 tbl. D-4.
59. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 40, at 10.
60. 18 US.C. § 3162(c).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) & (2); 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
63. There were 19,825 trials in 1980 and 19,992 in 1992. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 206 tbl. 332.
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increased while civil trials decreased during this period. Given the
priority accorded to criminal trials, the dramatic expansion of the
criminal trial docket, the greater percentage of complex cases, and the
increased call on judicial resources for sentencing and monitoring of
supervised release, it is not surprising that the resources available for
civil trials has been substantially reduced. Between 1980 and 1993, the
number of civil trials declined by twenty percent, from 13,191 to
10,527. 64 During the same period, criminal trials increased by fortythree percent, from 6,634 to 9,465.65 During this period, while the percentage of civil jury trials decreased slightly, the percentage of crimi66
nal jury trials increased from fifty-two percent to sixty percent.
It should be noted, moreover, that the decline in the number of
civil trials has occurred despite the fact that the civil docket has continued to grow, and indeed has grown far more rapidly than the criminal docket. Civil filings rose from approximately 125,000 in 1975 to
approximately 227,000 in 1992. This represents a slight decrease from
the high of 275,000 cases filed in 1985 before the statutory increase in
the required amount in controversy. Thus, criminal trials appear to be
displacing civil trials despite the fact that criminal cases now account
for only a small fraction-about seventeen percent-of total filings.
One way of expressing the availability of trial resources is to calculate
the number of trials per 100 cases fied. Between 1980 and 1992, the
number of civil trials per 100 case filings fell dramatically, from 7.8 to
4.6. In contrast, the trial resources devoted to criminal cases have remained far greater, though they too declined somewhat between 1980
and 1992, falling from 23.7 to 19.9 trials per 100 case filings. It should
be noted that these figures, which are based upon national averages,
underrepresent the changes experienced in districts where the criminal caseload has exploded.
(4) Impact on the Bureau of Prisons

The increase in the number of federal convictions and changes in
the federal sentencing laws have had a particularly significant impact
on the Bureau of Prisons. Between 1980 and 1993, the number of
federal inmates grew by 263 percent, from 19,025 to 69,143.67 In 1993
64. See d.
65. d.
66. Id. The percentage of jury trials in civil cases fell from 43% in 1980 to 41% in
1992. Id.
67. Statistics provided by Bureau of Justice Statistics, based upon HistoricStatistics on
Prisonersin State and FederalInstitutions, Yearend, 1925-86 and CorrectionalPopulations
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the total number of persons under the jurisdiction of federal correctional officials, which includes persons on supervised release and parole as well as persons who served terms of less than one year, was
89,586.68 The federal prison system, which did not exist sixty-four
years ago, is now the second largest prison system in the United
States, and it is growing more rapidly than all but a few state systems. 69 The operating budget for the Bureau of Prisons rose from
$314 million in 1980 to $1.8 billion in 1993.70 The federal prison system is now at 136 percent of capacity. 71 A federal correctional official
observed that there is now less difference between the inmates in federal prisons and those in state institutions; the prison populations reflect the degree to which federal offenses and enforcement priorities
overlap with those of the states.
One factor driving the census in the federal prisons is obviously
the number of federal prosecutions, and more particularly the number
of federal convictions. As noted above, both prosecutions and convictions are at or near historic highs. It would, however, be a mistake to
assume that these are the only factors responsible for the dramatic
increase in the number of federal inmates.
Another significant factor in the increase in federal inmates is the
increasing length of federal prison terms. 72 Between 1982 and 1992,
the mean length of all federal sentences increased from 47.8 months to
62.2 months. 73 The increased prison terms result in part from the
changes in the caseload mix discussed above (e.g., a higher percentage
of drug cases), and in part from the adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines and the enactment of many statutes requiring defendants to
serve mandatory minimum sentences. In particular, drug and weapon
sentences increased dramatically at the very time the number of those
in the United States, 1990-92. These figures include only prisoners with a maximum
sentence.
68.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1993 tbl. 2 (1994).

69. Between 1992 and 1993, the number of inmates in the federal system grew by
13.2%; during the same period only 5 states and the District of Columbia experienced
increases of 10% or more. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN1993, at 1 & 3
tbl. 3.
70. These figures do not include the capital budget, Le., the cost of new buildings.
71. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1993, at 6-7.
72. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 also eliminated parole for offenses that occurred after the effective date of the Sentencing Guidelines in 1987. That change, along
with the increased length of sentence, is increasing the average time served by federal
prisoners. During this period, the average time served before first release for all offenses
increased from 14.9 months in 1982 to 23.6 months in 1992. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CASE PROCESSING 1982-91 tbl. 18 (1993).
73. Id. at 17 tbl.17.
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prosecutions increased as well. The mean sentences in drug cases increased from 54.6 months to 82.2 months during this period, and mean
weapons sentences increased from 34.3 months to 76.9 months. 74
A 1994 Department of Justice study highlighted the extent to
which the expanding federal prison population is the product of sentencing policy in drug cases. The study found that 16,316 federal inmates were "low level" drug violators, defined as offenders with no
current or prior violence on their records, no involvement in sophisticated criminal activity, and no prior commitment.7 5 This accounted
for 21.2 percent of the total federal prison population. 76 Two thirds of
these low level drug offenders had received mandatory minimum
sentences.7 7 Among low level drug offenders, the Department concluded, sentences had increased 150 percent over what they were prior
to the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing legislation.78
(5) Impact on the FederalBudget and the Budget of the Department of
Justice
A federal budget official informed the participants in the Roundtable that the budget for the Department of Justice has been growing
twice as fast as that for the rest of the federal budget. He argued that
the federalization of crimes traditionally prosecuted by the states and
resulting budget increases could be seen as a form of in-kind fiscal
relief for state and local government, which do not have to pay for the
investigative, prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional resources that
are now devoted to these cases. He suggested that this support be
reassessed in light of the federal budget deficit and the budgets of the
states, some of which are running surpluses or cutting taxes. A state
official responded that the situation varies from state to state. Some
states are in a far less favorable budgetary situation than the federal
government. Moreover, the large federal tax burden places practical
limitations on the resources that can be raised by the states. If federal
taxes were reduced, states could increase their own taxes and correspondingly increase their expenditures for law enforcement.
74. Id
75.

U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, AN ANALYsis oF NoN-VoLENT DRUG OFFENDERS wrrH

MImALCRMiNAL

1994).

76. Id.
77. Id.

78. Id.

HIsTOmES (Feb. 1994), reprinted in 7

FED. SENT.

REP. 7 (July/Aug
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A Bureau of Justice statistics study of the changes in federal and
state and local expenditures for justice activities reveals some support
for the thesis that federal expenditures have grown more rapidly than
state and local expenditures, though the pattern is more complex if
one separates state and local expenditures. Employing a standard of
constant 1990 dollars per capita, the study concluded that between
1971 and 1990 federal government spending for all justice activitiesincluding police, courts, prosecutors, public defense, and corrections-rose 129.7 percent, more than double the rate of increase for
combined state and local spending. 79 Similarly, in actual dollars, federal expenditures increased from 1971-1990 by 668 percent, more than
the combined increase of 597 percent for all state and local governments.8 0 But both state government expenditures (which increased
848 percent) and county expenditures (which increased by 711 percent) outpaced the federal increases during this period. 8 1 Municipal
expenditures, on the other hand, increased at a much lower rate than
either state or federal expenses. 82 Moreover, the situation clearly varies from state to state. Per capita state and local government spending
on justice activities ranged from a high of more than $400 per person
in two states (New York and Alaska) to a low of $97 per person in
West Virginia.8 3 Per capita justice expenditures also varied by region,
being highest in the Northeast ($335) and West ($322), and lowest in
the South ($220) and Midwest ($202).84
Federal expenditures for prosecutorial resources have significantly outstripped those provided for the courts during this period.
While Congress has increased the appropriations for the federal
courts dramatically, doubling them over a six-year period, the number
of prosecutors has risen much more quickly than the number of federal judges. Indeed, the number of prosecutors per federal judicial
officer has doubled in the last ten years.8 5 The key investigative agencies of the Department of Justice also received substantial increases
between 1975 and 1993, which translates into the resources for an in86
creasing number of investigations.
79. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE
AND EMPLOYMENT 1990, at 4 tbl. 4 (1992).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 4-5 & tbl. 4.
82. Id. (increase of 393.5%).
83. Id. at 7 tbl. 9.
84. Id. at 7.
85. THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD, supra note 40, at 1, 15-19.
86. Id. at 16-19.
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(6) Reasons for the Accelerated Growth in FederalJurisdictionand
Caseload

Participants identified a number of factors responsible for the increased federalization of criminal law. Some of the changes were legislative, particularly the enactment of new offenses and the enactment
of new sentencing measures (both the Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing laws) that guarantee the imposition of tougher
sentences on cases brought in federal court than would be available if
the cases were brought in state court. There was a general recognition
that the state prosecutors and state courts were straining under record
caseloads and that cases are often shifted to the federal system because greater resources are available there. The resource issue comes
into play at every stage. There are greater federal resources available
to federal investigators and prosecutors, and cases come to trial more
quickly in the federal courts. Finally, although federal prisons are
over capacity, they are generally less crowded than state institutions.
Many state prisons are so overcrowded that offenders serve only a
small portion of their sentences before they must be released to comply with federally mandated caps on inmate capacity.
Some participants argued that there has been a change in crime
itself, with more and different forms of crime, especially more violent
crime, which required the federal government to respond. Others
suggested that the principal change had been in the public's perception of an increase in crime, and the resulting political pressure for
crime prevention and control measures, fanned by a media preoccupation with crime and violence. This latter view finds support in the
statistics compiled by the Department of Justice, which concluded in a
1994 study that the rate of violent crime fell nine percent from 1981 to
1992.87

There was general agreement that most citizens want action and
that jurisdictional issues mean little to the general public. As one participant noted, people are frightened, they want action, and they don't
care whether it's state or federal. Another participant suggested that
the pressure for federal action reflects the fact that the public has
come to rely increasingly on the federal government to provide solutions to any important national problem, including crime.
87. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT CRIME 1
(1994). In 1992 the percentage of households in which a member had been the victim of
violence other than homicide was the lowest since 1975, when the data was first compiled.
Id. On the other hand, in 1992 violent crime against blacks was the highest ever recorded.
i
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A Reevaluation of the Principles that Should Govern the
Federalization of Criminal Law

Participants in the Roundtable agreed on a key point: the states
should and must continue to play the dominant role in criminal law
enforcement, and the federal government's role should remain far
more limited than that played by the states. Though Congress might,
in theory, employ the commerce power to preempt most of the states'
traditional jurisdiction over crime, no support was voiced for ousting
state and local authority.
Discussion focused on a variety of advantages to the traditional
allocation of authority to the states. State and local prosecutors (and
some judges) are elected, and they are responsible to and in touch
with their varied constituencies. State prosecutors and state courts are
geographically closer to-and hence more convenient for-victims
and witnesses. States have developed local social services and outreach programs that the federal government cannot match. Federal
authorities are necessarily farther removed from the grass roots.88
State corrections programs also have built-in advantages. Since
state corrections institutions are located closer to offenders' home
communities, they facilitate contact with family and reintegration into
the community. Federal institutions, in contrast, draw their inmate
populations from a nationwide base, and inmates may be housed hundreds or even thousands of miles from their friends and families. Sustaining family contacts and reintegrating the inmate into his home
community are inherently more difficult in the federal system. It was
also noted that large bureaucratic national institutions are better
suited to responding to individual offenders after the fact. Such institutions are less effective than local programs that seek to change offenders' relationships with the individuals and groups to which they
will eventually return.
One statistic was cited repeatedly: state prosecutors and state
courts now handle roughly ninety-five percent of all criminal prosecutions, while federal courts and federal prosecutors process the remaining five percent. The disproportionate share of the cases now handled
in the state system, the magnitude of the caseload, and the small size
of the federal judiciary make it virtually impossible for the federal
88. One state official also argued that the smaller size of state systems is also an inherent advantage because it permits better coordination among the various branches of government. The degree of advantage no doubt varies from state to state, depending on size.
It may have little effect in populous states such as New York and California.
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government to take over the lion's share of criminal enforcement responsibility. In 1992 there were 1,188,569 criminal felony cases filed
in the 35 states that provided data to the National Center for State
Courts,89 and more than 12 million criminal cases ified in the 47 states
that reported combined felony and misdemeanor filings. 90 Obviously
no more than a small fraction of these cases can be heard by the 649
federal judges on the federal district courts. 91 Even a significant increase in the size of the federal judiciary would still leave the vast bulk
of criminal cases in the state courts.
Finally, the variety inherent in the federal system permits desirable experimentation. Many of the most promising trends in criminal
law enforcement began at the state and local level, including specialized drug courts, community policing, boot camps, and sentencing
guidelines. A number of state participants in the Roundtable noted
that there is, as yet, no evidence that federal approaches are superior
to those adopted by various states on matters such as sentencing
92
policy.
Participants also noted that there are costs to the increasing overlap between the state and federal criminal laws. Some resources are
being duplicated, and other resources are being allocated to efforts to
coordinate the efforts of state, local, and federal officials at the investigative and prosecutorial stages. The overlap also increases the potential for both duplicative prosecutions and for disparate results among
similarly situated offenders, depending on whether a state or federal
prosecution is brought.
A. The Sullivan and Marcus Proposals
Much of the discussion at the Roundtable was based upon statements by Professor Kathleen Sullivan and Judge Stanley Marcus, each
89.

STATE JUSTICE INsTTuTE, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, ANNUAL RE-

1992, at 40 fig. 1.58 (1994).
90. This number was calculated from the state filings reported in id. at 31 fig. 1.48.
91. It should be noted, however, that state court judges currently have far heavier
caseloads than do federal judges. In 1992 there were 75 criminal cases and 355 civil cases
filed per judge in the federal system; in the state courts of general jurisdiction there were
417 criminal cases and 995 civil cases per judge. Id.at 44 fig. 1.61.
92. For example, some states might decide to act upon the basis of social science rePORT

search concluding that longer prison sentences and mandatory sentencing schemes, such as
the "three strikes and you're out" legislation, do not reduce crime. See, e.g., Michael
Tonry, RacialPolitics,Racial Disparities,and the War on Crime, 40 CRIME & DELNO. 475
(1994); CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF LAW & SoCrETY, PA. STATE UNIV., INCARCERATION
AND CRIME: FACING FISCAL REALITIES IN PENNSYLVANIA.
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of whom proposed a list of criteria for the federalization of criminal
law.
Professor Sullivan proposed that there are four bases on which
the federal government has a comparative advantage over state government in the prosecution of crime (as well as in civil adjudication):
1) where the federal sovereign is directly involved, i.e., an offense
against the sovereign itself (treason), or against its treasury or its
officers, or a crime committed on federal property;
2) where efficiency-based considerations favor federal prosecution
because of the interstate or international character of the offense, or
economies of scale, or where the conduct threatens to overwhelm
the local authorities (e.g., the activities of the Klu Klux Klan immediately after the Civil War);
3) where uniformity is important, as in the context of antitrust and
securities regulation and the criminal enforcement authority that
underlies these regulatory schemes;
4) where the states are unable or unwilling to face the problem, as
in the case of the enforcement of the civil rights statutes.
Later in the day, participants pondered what ought to count as a comparative advantage in the context of criminal enforcement. For example, is it proper at the legislative level to extend federal jurisdiction
over intrastate crime that has traditionally been the province of the
state system because federal sentences are longer, or federal procedural rules of various types are more favorable to the prosecution? In
the context of individual cases, prosecutors often bring cases into the
federal system for just such reasons. Later discussion considered
some of the problems raised when prosecutors select a few cases-or
"cherry pick"-to get the advantages of favorable federal laws.
Judge Marcus suggested a list of similar criteria for federal criminal jurisdiction:
1) crimes against the United States itself, i.e., against its treasury or
its officers, or on its property;
2) criminal enterprises that by virtue of their scope and magnitude
spill across interstate and/or international boundaries, e.g., international narcotics cartels;
3) crime that is essentially intrastate, where the scope is so great
that there is a need for federal resources and concurrent jurisdiction
is justified, e.g., large bank fraud cases;
4) enforcement of the rights of insular minorities, e.g., civil rights
cases;
5) systematic and pervasive corruption of the local system, e.g., Operation Greylord, the investigation of corruption of the Cook
County court system.
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Judge Marcus observed that the two most difficult and controversial
questions today involve the role the federal government should play
regarding violent crime, which has traditionally been the province of
state and local enforcement, and narcotic enforcement. Judge Marcus's third criterion, the extension of federal jurisdiction over intrastate crime in order to provide federal resources, was the focus of a
great deal of discussion throughout the day.
How much difference is there between these two proposals?
Both agree on the first criterion, a direct injury to the federal government. Professor Sullivan's second criterion, efficiency-based considerations, seems to collapse two of Judge Marcus's criteria, criminal
enterprises that spill over interstate or international boundaries, and
intrastate crime of such magnitude that there is a need for federal
resources. The differences in wording may be significant. Professor
Sullivan explicitly approves of federalization for reasons of economy
of scale or because illegal conduct "threatens to overwhelm local authorities." This last phrase may have tremendous expansive potential;
if they are inadequately financed, state authorities may be overwhelmed by even garden variety crime. This presents quite a different
issue than large scale bank fraud cases, which may be quite different
in kind from other offenses prosecuted by the states, and present a
self-limiting category.
Professor Sullivan's third and fourth criteria have no counterparts
in Judge Marcus's scheme. She posits that the need for uniformity
may justify federalization, as in the context of antitrust and securities
legislation and the criminal enforcement that underlies this enforcement scheme. It should be noted that similar regulatory schemes
backed by criminal sanctions are common, including the regulations
involving occupational health and safety, pure food and drugs, national labor relations, coal mine safety, and air and water quality. Finally, she suggests that the federal government has a comparative
advantage in prosecuting "when states are unable or unwilling to face
up to a problem, as in the case of the enforcement of the civil rights
statutes." This category poses real difficulties. Though Judge Marcus
agrees that federal enforcement of the civil rights laws is appropriate,
he does so on a different and far more limited ground. Read literally,
Professor Sullivan's final criterion would support federal intervention
whenever there is a federal judgment that the states have failed adequately to "face up to"-or perhaps to solve-some facet of crime.
Yet failure to act may reflect a deliberate state policy. Nonenforcement may reflect the state authorities' view that prosecuting the con-
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duct in question is comparatively unimportant, or indeed the policy
that prosecuting such conduct would be undesirable. Should it be the
federal government's role to force the states to face up to crime across
the board, or should such intervention be limited to situations in
which there is some special federal interest in the subject matter?
Judge Marcus's last two criteria identify more specialized federal
interests that would justify federal enforcement when state officials
are unable or unwilling to act: the federal interest in the enforcement
of the rights of "insular minorities," and the federal interest in the
prosecution of "systematic and pervasive corruption of the local system." In the presence of discrimination or pervasive corruption, federal officials may no longer defer to state and local authorities, and
political checks on the behavior of local officials are of doubtful value.
Hence the justification for federal enforcement is greater than it
would be in other situations when state officials are unable or unwilling to act. Further, in the case of discrete minorities, the federal government has special enforcement responsibilities under the Civil War
93
Amendments.
B. A Presumption Against the Federalization of New Offenses
Written materials presented to the participants suggested that
there be a presumption against the creation of new federal offenses, 94
and considerable support for such a presumption was voiced. Those
speaking in favor of such a presumption agreed that it could be overcome if three criteria were met. There was general agreement on the
formulation of the first two criteria: in order to overcome the presumption there must be a substantial federal interest, and the states
must be unable to accomplish this interest. 95 The third criterion was
formulated differently by various speakers. Some referred to a requirement of a showing that federal enforcement would be more effective. This would require a determination of what it means to be
"effective." Is federal enforcement more effective if the federal government has greater financial resources? If so, that will nearly always
93. It has also been suggested that there is also a special federal responsibility to prosecute state and local corruption under the Guarantee Clause. See Adam Kurland, The
Guarantee Clause of the Constitutionas a Basis for FederalProsecutionsof State and Local
Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 367 (1989).

94. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JusncE 47 (Long Range Planning Series, Paper No. 2) (1994).
95. Since the application of this standard requires a determination whether a federal
interest is present, it requires agreement on what constitutes a federal interest. This issue
is discussed supra.
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be the case. On the other hand, effectiveness could be defined much
more narrowly, meaning that enforcement called upon some innate
feature of the federal system, such as its ability to handle interstate
and international activity. Another speaker focused on whether federal enforcement would be consistent with the expertise of the federal
system and personnel; this would be similar to a test of effectiveness
that focused on the unique features of the federal system.
A federal judge, in comments provided after the Roundtable,
supported a presumption against the enactment of new federal crimes
and sought to refine the criteria. The key, in his view, should be the
question whether a federal criminal statute would enlarge federal jurisdiction so much that it would interfere with the federal courts' core
functions. If so, federalization in areas of concurrent jurisdiction
should be resisted. This view would require not only an analysis of the
federal interest supporting a proposal, but its potential impact on the
other business of the federal courts. The application of this standard
poses two difficulties. First, agreement must be reached on what constitutes the "core functions" of the federal courts. Second, it would be
more difficult than it might appear at first blush to identify the impact
on the courts. The impact criminal legislation has on the courts is a
function not merely of the crimes on the books, but more importantly
of the funds appropriated by Congress for enforcement and the policies of the Department of Justice and the various United States Attorneys' offices. By itself, the enactment of a new criminal statute does
not increase the number of prosecutions in the federal courts, nor
does it necessarily mean that federal prosecutors will bring cases
under the new statute rather than cases under older statutes.
C. A Presumption in Favor of Employing Federal Resources in Support
of State and Local Enforcement, Rather than to Bring Federal
Prosecutions in Areas of Concurrent Jurisdiction
Much of the Roundtable discussion centered on the desirability
of providing federal resources to the states rather than enacting new
federal offenses or appropriating additional funds for more federal enforcement. Once a federal interest is recognized, Congress can employ a variety of means. In areas of traditional state enforcement,
there might be a presumption in favor of providing federal support for
additional state prosecutions, rather than authorizing or funding additional federal prosecutions.
Several speakers expressed strong opposition to creating new federal crimes as a means of providing financial resources to aid either
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(1) the wholesale prosecution of new classes of intrastate crime or (2)
the selective federal prosecution of just a few cases of intrastate activity. Several federal participants argued in favor of providing financial
support and other federal resources to assist the states rather than
creating new federal crimes or prosecuting more cases under the present federal statutes. For example, the new Crime Bill will provide federal grants to hire local police and set up local drug courts. One
congressional participant spoke in favor of using federal resources to
provide seed money to encourage states to adopt approaches that are
working elsewhere. In general, state participants seemed to support
the idea of federal support of the state and local criminal justice system. Another participant spoke in favor of federal technical and financial aid to state enforcement, particularly state juvenile courts,
drug courts, and unified family courts.
There are a variety of advantages to funding state and local enforcement rather than adding a new layer of federal enforcement.
First, the creation of new federal crimes, unlike the provision of support for state and local prosecutions, requires the reallocation of
scarce federal judicial resources when the state courts, if adequately
funded, are fully adequate. Second, unless massive resources are provided, new federal crimes are unlikely to be enforced in more than a
token number of cases. Bringing a small number of prosecutions in
federal courts inevitably creates a disparity in the way similarly situated offenders are treated, particularly regarding their sentences. The
vast majority of such offenders are prosecuted in the state system, and
only a few are prosecuted in the federal courts, where sentences are
often far heavier. What justifies the disparity in these sentences?
Congress and federal prosecutors generally cite the need for a deterrent effect, arguing that the possibility of prosecution under the harsher federal laws will deter future violations. If that is the case, would
it be acceptable to randomly select one of every 200 federal offenders
and double or triple his sentence in order to deter future violations?
This would fly in the face of the Sentencing Guidelines, though it has
the same practical effect as bringing only a handful of federal prosecutions when the remainder of similarly situated cases are prosecuted
under more lenient state law.
One state participant noted that federal participants seem to be
assuming that more incarceration will provide more deterrence, when
in fact that may not be the case. A recent study of state data found
that increasing incarceration levels did not reduce the rate of violent
crime, and accordingly "at both the national and state levels, incapaci-
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tation as a crime control strategy need not be directed as broadly as it
'96 The study concluded
is."
that "[u]sing incarceration as the primary
sanction for the bulk of offenders does not appear to be justified given
'97
what we do know."
One key question to be explored is whether it is possible to provide federal leadership-including not only model programs and technical assistance, but also continuing financial support for state
justice-without unduly trenching on state autonomy and losing the
benefits of state experimentation.
Some state participants voiced strong opposition to the idea of
the federal government providing funds to support the state criminal
justice system, and particularly the state courts, on the ground that
this inevitably makes them "federal dominions." While other state
participants supported the provision of state funds to support state
and local enforcement, they generally opposed the imposition of federal standards as a condition of federal funding, arguing that no one
has shown that the federal procedures are better than the state procedures and that experimentation with a variety of standards is beneficial. Federal standards are too far removed from the grass roots,
where there is the most expertise about particular problems. One
state participant argued in favor of a clear division of authority; it is
better for the federal government to take over a function entirely than
to impose onerous federal regulations as a condition of federal support of functions for which the states remain responsible. Another
state participant particularly objected to federal efforts to impose conditions without providing financial support.
On the other hand, some comments by state participants suggested that internal deficiencies in the state systems sometimes lead
state actors to prefer the federal system. For example, state prosecutors spoke of the need to take cases to federal court to gain the advantage of federal laws authorizing wiretaps, limiting discovery,
permitting the joinder of multiple defendants to enhance efficiency,
and authorizing and enforcing long sentences for extremely dangerous
offenders. Some might argue that state officials who believe the federal standards in question are beneficial should see the strings attached to federal resources as the carrots that could lead states to
adopt laws to improve the functioning of the state and local criminal
96. DARRELL STEFFENSMEIER,

INCARCERATION AND CRiE: FACING FIsCAL REAu-

Tins IN PENNsYLVANIA 8 (1992) (report sponsored by the Pennsylvania Commission on

Sentencing).
97. Id
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justice systems across the board, rather than providing an ad hoc fix in
a few cases. Indeed, it could be argued that it is both inefficient and
unfair to require federal subsidies for states that have failed to adopt
beneficial laws to aid law enforcement, such as laws authorizing wire
taps, or joinder, discovery, and sentencing provisions. It was also
noted that it is difficult to justify the fairness of the significant differences between the sentences of those prosecuted in the federal system
and those prosecuted for the same conduct in the state system, particularly when the issue of reducing sentencing disparity was one of the
primary justifications for the adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Participating constitutional scholars pointed out that Congress
has a variety of alternatives if it wishes to see various federal procedural rules and sentencing laws apply to cases that have traditionally
been prosecuted by the states. So long as Congress has constitutional
authority over the conduct in question (under the Commerce Clause,
for example), it may create federal offenses and require them to be
tried in state courts following federal law. 98 Or Congress could simply
enact a law requiring that the desired federal procedures be adopted
in any case meeting certain criteria (such as an impact on interstate
commerce), including state offenses prosecuted in state courts. No
support for such an approach was voiced.
There was also a recognition that federal monies are not likely to
last forever. Congressional participants warned that Congress could
not and would not permanently federalize the funding of local law
enforcement with no strings attached; ultimately local jurisdictions
will have to decide whether to pick up the costs. If the money is not
permanent, there will be trouble down the line. One state participant
likened the situation to giving an addict one heroin fix: what happens
when you get over that high?
Other problems with federal funding of state and local enforcement were raised. Federal funding for one part of the system increases pressures on other parts of the system. For example, federal
funding of more police is fine, but how will the states pay for the other
costs of the cases these police will generate in the courts and corrections system? Other participants expressed concern that federal resources may not be well spent. LEAA resources were often not used
wisely. Indeed, state officials have sometimes taken federal monies
intended for new initiatives and used them instead to pay current expenses. Concerns about how effectively federal resources will be
98.

But see supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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spent may lead to the imposition of controls which states find burdensome or believe are substantively unjustified.
D. Judicial Impact Statement

One participant advocated the idea of a requirement that new
federal criminal legislation be accompanied by a new kind of impact
statement that would identify the cost and benefits of the initiative in
question and then compare the costs and benefits of alternative measures. This would allow a comparison of alternatives, such as federal
prosecution of a large number of new cases, federal prosecution of a
few selected, and federal financial and technical support for state and
local prosecutions. Such a procedural requirement would spotlight alternative federal responses to crime and force consideration and public debate regarding the relative costs and benefits.
E. Shifting the Focus: Federalization Occurs as Prosecutorial Discretion
The criteria identified by Professor Sullivan and Judge Marcus
and the presumptions discussed above provide guidance on the legislative issue of when to create new federal offenses. While recognizing
the importance of limiting the federalization of crime, several participants suggested that the breadth of the federal criminal legislation. on
the books was far less important than the question of the actual discretionary enforcement. Under this view, the most important question is when federal prosecutors should exercise their discretion, not
whether Congress should enact new federal offenses. It was pointed
out that federal prosecutors do not currently prosecute all of the conduct that falls under the existing 3,000 federal offenses. In some districts, the federal courts are not currently overburdened because the
federal prosecutor brings only cases of serious federal interest; this
demonstrates that prosecutorial discretion can handle many of the
problems of any possible legislative over-federalization. Another participant observed that the breadth of federal criminal statutes is less
important than the amount of money that is provided for
enforcement.
While there was certainly general support for the sound exercise
of federal prosecutorial discretion in consultation with state and local
officials, various concerns were raised about extending the current
pattern of the discretionary selection of a limited number of prosecutions under extremely broad federal statutes that overlap with state
and local laws.
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Federal prosecutors identified several problems with expanding
the number of federal crimes. First, when the legislature makes everything a priority, nothing is a priority. In other words, an overbroad
legislative mandate provides no guidance to prosecutors. Second, the
more federal crimes Congress authorizes, the more time federal prosecutors must spend working out their cooperation with state and local
officials. One federal prosecutor observed that cherry picking a few
cases may enhance the safety of the community and set a high-profle
example for state officials, but it also takes the pressure off state officials to reform their own laws and procedures.
Other participants expressed concern that the creation of new
federal offenses that will be enforced in only a few symbolic prosecutions raises unrealistic expectations, which may ultimately leave the
public very disillusioned and may also delay more far-reaching
solutions.
The federal prosecutors agreed that they often cherry pick a small
number of cases where federal law is advantageous on procedural
matters or sentencing; this can send a deterrent signal or take a particularly dangerous offender off the streets for a longer time. The state
prosecutors agreed that they often ask their federal counterparts to
take such cases. In these cases, to use Professor Sullivan's terminology, the federal prosecutors have a comparative advantage. One participant asked whether the state participants were being consistent
when they objected to the imposition of federal procedures and standards, yet frequently sought to move cases to the federal system in
order to have the benefit of the application of these very federal
standards.
Prosecutorial discretion to select out a few cases (cherry picking)
inevitably produces disparity in the treatment of these offenders in
comparison with others who are prosecuted in the state system. It is
difficult to square this disparity with the efforts under the Sentencing
Guidelines to ensure that persons who have engaged in the same conduct receive the same sentence. Within the federal system we would
never countenance the selection of one offender out of one hundred
to receive a far harsher sentence in order to deter others, but this is
exactly what we do when we pull one out of one hundred cases into
the federal system to send a deterrent message.

